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Abstract
Smart grid enables the integration of large-scale renewable energy resources (RERs) into the power system, but the 
subsequent intermittency and uncertainty can have an adverse impact on the networks’ reliability, safety and 
operation efficiency. Meanwhile, demand response helps greatly mitigate the negative impact associated with RERs.
Hence, from the engineering’s perspective, the complexity and intelligence of the power system have been on an 
unprecedented level. In such a complex and intelligent power system, it is essential to investigate the impact of RERs 
and demand response on the market equilibrium in order to help market participants to make scientific decisions. In 
this paper, firstly, an overall model of major market participants together with the constraints of transmission and 
generation is established. Then, the energy market is analyzed with RERs’ uncertainties and demand response. 
Finally, a 4-bus network is utilized to validate theoretical results, indicating that as the uncertainties increase, power 
system’s operation costs and equilibrium shift will be enlarged; and the effect of demand response can narrow the 
equilibrium shift and reduce RERs’ integration costs.
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1. Introduction
With increasing concerns about global energy resources shortage, greenhouse gas effect and 
environmental pollution, smart grid has gained popularity globally for its unique advantages. 
Consequently, a large amount of smart technologies about renewable energy resources (RERs) generation 
and integration, storage technology, control signals to loads, energy efficiency and smart buildings have 
emerged. Admittedly, with the rapid development of RERs generation and integration technology, large-
scale integration of RERs will bring about intermittency and randomness to the networks, which will 
certainly lead to integration costs. Meanwhile, demand response, which is aimed at guiding consumers’ 
behaviors according to the price signal, plays a significant role in mitigating such integration costs.
Therefore, from the engineering’s perspective, the complexity and intelligence of the power system have 
been on an unprecedented level due to the comprehensive impact of RERs and demand response. So it is 
essential for us to investigate such impact on the market equilibrium to provide support for participants in 
the electricity market to make scientific decisions.
Literature review about the impact of RERs and demand response on the power system is presented
here. Firstly, it is known that RERs respond actively to deal with energy and environment problems, but 
they have the disadvantage of intermittency and uncertainty due to their physical characteristics. One of 
the most serious problems that may emerge is limited dispatchability of intermittent generation [1]. In 
particular, for wind farms, problems such as the variability in resource availability, errors in forecasting 
resource availability and loads should also be taken into consideration [2]. The frequency modulation, 
peak regulation and economic planning and operation of the overall power system may be influenced by 
the integration of RERs as well [3]. Secondly, in recent years, there is a rapid development and self-
improvement in demand response, which plays a significant role in reducing potential forecast error and 
redispatch costs [4-6]. Load shape and operation efficiency will be improved using demand response [7].
It is assumed that the real-time pricing is implemented. When actual wind generation is less than forecast, 
consumer demand will decrease due to high costs associated with ancillary services used to compensate 
the generation shortage. Consequently, costs to meet consumer demand will fall. Similarly, when actual 
wind generation is more than forecast, since wind generation has zero marginal cost there is an increase in 
electricity demand [8, 9]. Nevertheless, none of the studies involved problems concerning the 
comprehensive impact of RERs and demand response on the market equilibrium point. Therefore, this 
paper concentrates on the market equilibrium analysis based on the integration of RERs and demand 
response.
The remainder of this paper is organized as follows: the general market equilibrium model based on 
agent behaviors is presented in Section 2. In Section 3, the market equilibrium in the absence of RERs and 
demand response is formulated and then perturbation analysis is given. Section 4 describes the suitability 
of the model using a case study and therefore the conclusion is obtained. Concluding remarks are shown 
in Section 5.
2. General market equilibrium model based on agent behaviors
Participants in the electricity market mainly consist of generating companies, consumer companies and 
independent system operator (ISO). In this paper, attention is merely paid to the corresponding agent 
behaviors of the three types of participants. Models of agent behaviors will be presented in this section, 
and then the market equilibrium is established. The key is to determine the generation of units and 
electricity demand of consumers, so that the market equilibrium can be obtained considering capacity 
constraints and the social welfare is maximized at the same time. It should be noted that the constraints 
that generating companies, consumer companies and ISO are subject to may conflict with each other, 
making the optimization problem more complex. For example, electricity price has links with both 
generating companies and consumer companies. As far as the consumers are concerned, low price means 
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low expenses so that they prefer low price. For generating companies, low price with previous costs leads 
to falling profits so that they are more willing to accept high price. It is obvious to see the conflict of 
constraints associated with the electricity price. In this case, ISO have to compensate generation 
companies who have expensive units used to ensure power balance. As a consequence, under the market 
equilibrium, the electricity price and amount, which are referred to the optimal local marginal price (LMP)
and the optimal dispatch respectively, will be obtained. In addition, LMP is the corresponding shadow 
price. Models of three kinds of participants will be established in the following parts of this section.
2.1. Model of generating companies
It is assumed that the total number of generating units in the generating company is Tg. According to 
the power characteristics of generating units, the production of each unit j is divided into r power blocks,
j=1,2,…,Tg, , r=1,2,…,T
j
g. The power amount generated by unit j in block r is described as A
jr
g, and the 
relevant linear operation cost is described as Cjrg. In addition, p
j
n is the LMP of unit j at node n. The 
objective of the generating company is to maximize its overall profit, so the optimization model is stated 
as:
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Where, ξj and ψjr denote the corresponding shadow prices. A
jr
g are decision variables. Attention should 
be paid to pjn which are variables in the overall OPF problem, but remain constant in this optimization 
problem. Necessary and sufficient conditions for the optimization model are shown as:
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Dual variables ξj and ψjr
2.2. Model of consumer companies
are used here, corresponding to the KKT conditions [12].
It is assumed that the total number of electricity-consuming units in the consumer company is Td.
According to the power characteristics of these units, the demand of each unit k is divided into h blocks,
k=1,2,…,Td, h=1,2,…,T
k
d . The power amount demanded by unit k in block h is described as A
kh
d , and the 
relevant linear utility function is denoted as Ukhd , which means the value created by the consumer company 
while consuming electricity. In addition, pnk is the LMP of unit k at node n. The objective of the consumer 
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company is to maximize its overall profit, and profit is described as the difference between Ukhd and p
n
k .
Therefore, the optimization model is stated as follows:
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k and ηkh mean corresponding shadow prices. A
kh
d are decision variables. Similarly, attention 
should be paid to pnk , which are variables in the overall OPF problem, but remain constant in this 
optimization problem. Necessary and sufficient conditions for the optimization model are shown as:
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Dual variables τk and ηkh
2.3. Model of ISO
are included here, corresponding to the KKT conditions [12].
It is assumed that the electricity market in this paper is wholesale and operates as follows: Firstly, 
generating companies submit their bidding generation of the units and the corresponding price to the pool, 
and consumer companies offer their bidding electricity demand and the corresponding price at the same 
time. Then, the electricity market is cleared by ISO using an appropriate market-clearing method resulting 
in equilibrium price and production and consumption schedules. In the end, the market equilibrium is
obtained and the corresponding equilibrium price is LMP. Actually, network constraints such as losses 
and line capacity limits may be included in the market-clearing method. There are two points to be 
considered here. The first is the determination of LMP. That is to say, the price at a certain node for the 
power generated by the generation company is its LMP, and similarly, the price at a certain node for the 
power consumed by the consumer company is its LMP. The second point is to determine which 
constraints to be selected. Network constrains mainly consist of transmission losses and line capacity 
limits, and power flow may be affected by technologies constraints. For example, power flow may 
encounter congestion when approaching its maximum limit. In addition, heat losses in power lines are 
obvious, but they are not included in the model for ease of exposition.
Standard market-clearing method is based on the social welfare which is maximized in this
optimization model [13].
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Considering the objective function, the first term means the revenue due to surpluses of bids from 
generating companies, and the second term denotes the revenue due to surpluses of bids from consumer 
companies. Also, constraints (14) and (15) are based on power balance and capacity limits, respectively.
And εx and σxy
Actually, this optimization problem can be restated as the relationship between power blocks levels A
are associated Lagrange multipliers.
jr
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Where, Ajrg, A
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d and p
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k
2.4. Introduce of perturbation parameters
are decision variables. In short, models of agent behaviors including generating 
companies, consumer companies and ISO have already been formulated. The key is to determine the 
equilibrium point which optimizes the three types of participants at the same time. The equilibrium point 
is subject to the following conditions: 1) maximum profit for each generating company; 2) maximum 
utility for each consumer company; 3) maximum net social welfare for ISO.
Scholars at home and abroad have investigated the impact of RERs on power system. Research results
indicate that the intermittency and uncertainty of RERs will lead to uncertainties of power generation and 
thus influence the market equilibrium. To measure the uncertainties effectively, ∆jrg are introduced into the 
decision variable Ajrg in the model of generation companies. The procedure is as follows: 1) A
jr
g are divided 
into A jrgT (j=1,…,nT) and A
jr
gR (j=1,…,nR), where nT means traditional dispatchable generating units and nR
means renewable energy resources such as wind and solar energy, which are certainly non-dispatchable; 
2)∆jrg are introduced into non-dispatchable generating companies, as
10),1( <∆<∆−= jrg
jr
g
jr
gR
jr
gR AA
It should be noted that ∆
(22)
jr
g
Demand response can reduce integration costs of RERs by optimizing users’ electricity-consuming 
behaviours using price signal. Dispatchable load A
may come from forecast errors, and are out of control and nonlinear.
kh
dl are introduced when consumers’ units are divided
into diapatchable and non-diapatchable ones by generating companies. It is assumed that Akhdl are affected 
by demand response obviously and are sensible to price changes. To measure the effect of demand 
92  LIU Daoxin et al. / Systems Engineering Procedia 4 (2012) 87 – 98
6 LIU Daoxin, et al./ Systems Engineering Procedia 00 (2011) 000–000
response effectively, control parameter γkhd are therefore introduced to reflect the response of users to price 
changes in the form of real-time pricing under demand response.
10),1( <<−= khd
kh
d
kh
d
kh
d AA γγ
Where,
(23)
kh
dA denote electricity consumed by unit k at block h in the form of real-time pricing under 
demand response. Positive γkhd mean that electricity consumed in this block has decreased, while negative 
γkhd mean that electricity consumed in this block has increased. In this paper, attention is merely paid to the 
positive γkhd , because there may be a decrease in power supply due to the integration of RERs. For example, 
positive γkhd will emerge if ∆
jr
g
As the control parameter can effectively reflect the impact of RTP on electricity consumed by users, it 
is described as the curtailment factor.
>0, which means that power generated by non-dispatchable units has fallen. 
Now, ∆ jrg are utilized to measure the uncertainties of RERs, and γ
kh
d are employed to reflect the 
mitigation effect of demand response. Both ∆jrg and γ
kh
d are referred to the perturbation parameters, but ∆
jr
g
are unknown and γkhd
It should be noted that γ
are assumed to be controllable.
kh
d are used to measure the effect of RTP in the model. The inherent assumption 
here is that the non-dispatchable consumer company will suitably adjust its demand after observing the 
LMP, which is the solution of (10)-(12). Also, curtailment factor γkhd
3. Market equilibrium analysis based on RERs and demand response
can reflect the effect of changes in 
users’ electricity-using behaviours. Hence, it is assumed that RTP is equal to LMP in this paper.
3.1. Market equilibrium model
It is clear that LMP in model of generating companies and consumer companies are input variables, 
and in the optimization model of ISO, they are dual variables. Therefore, there is a tight link between the 
three optimization models.
As each of these three sets of optimization problems are linear programming problems, Karush-Kuhn-
Tucker(KKT) optimality conditions is employed to explain the optimal solutions. The optimality 
conditions of the three optimization problems bring about a Mixed Linear Complementarity 
Problem(MLCP), which corresponds to the market equilibrium. As a result, the market equilibrium is 
obtained when the necessary and sufficient conditions (4)-(6), (10)-(12) and (16)-(21) are satisfied
simultaneously. This optimization problem can be simply stated as the solution of the following MLCP:
A vector x*∈Rn is required to meet the following constraints:
0,0,0)( ≥+≥=+ qMxxqMxxT (24)
Where, x∈Rn×1 is the variable vector, square metric M∈Rn×n and q∈Rn×1 includes operating costs, the 
bidding of generating companies and consumer companies, maximum and minimum power generated by 
generating companies, maximum and minimum power consumed by consumer companies and maximum 
thermal limit of transmission lines. The solution x* of MLCP is the market equilibrium point, which is 
stated as follows:
),(* qMMLCPx
∆
= (25)
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Definition 1: A matrix M is called a P-matrix if its all principal minors are positive.
Two theorems that discuss the MLCP are given here [14, 15].
Theorem 1: In the MLCP defined in (24), M is a P-matrix if and only if the MLCP(M, q) has a unique
solution for any q∈Rn, moreover, if M is a P-matrix then there is a neighborhood N of M, such that all 
matrices in N are P-matrix. Therefore, we can define a solution function x (M, q): M×Rn nR+→ , where x
(M, q) is the solution of MLCP (M, q) and }0{ ≥∈=+ xRxR
nn .
Theorem 2: Matrix A is a P-matrix if and only if (I−D+DA) is nonsingular for any diagonal matrix
D=diag(d),0≤di≤1,i=1,2,…,n. Furthermore, if x(A, q) and x(B, p) are the solution of the corresponding 
MLCP(A, q) and MLCP(B, p) respectively, then:
pqpBxBAAqAxPBx −+−≤− ),()()(),(),( β (26)
DDADIA d
1
]1,0[ )(max)(
−
∈ +−=β (27)
Dependence of x(M, q) on the market parameters is described in Theorem 2. It is assumed that all 
components for x in (24) have been suitably normalized so as to satisfy the condition‖x*
3.2. Perturbation analysis
‖≤1.
The solution of MLCP(M, q) is the market equilibrium point in the absence of RERs and demand 
response. It is known that renewable energy resources are used widely to deal with energy crisis and 
environmental pollution. For example, wind and solar energy are commonly utilized to generate power. 
Nevertheless, the intermittency and randomness of such resources have caused uncertainties in power 
generation, which also has a big impact on the market equilibrium. Fortunately, demand response can 
reduce the integration costs of RERs. As is stated above, ∆jrg denote the uncertainties caused by wind 
forecast errors, and γkhd denote the effect of demand response. The M and q will change accordingly in the 
presence of perturbation parameters, and M+∆M and q+∆q are used to describe the change. Hence, the 
corresponding optimization problem and the corresponding equilibrium point are stated as follows:
0)()(,0,0))()(( ≥∆++∆+≥=∆++∆+ qqxMMxqqxMMxT (28)
),(* qqMMMLCPx ∆+∆+=
∆
∆ (29)
Definition 2: Define non-dimensional perturbation parameters φM and φq, constant λ and N are defined 
respectively as:
MM Mφ≤∆ (30)
qq qφ≤∆ (31)
MMM )(βελ = (32)
{ }λβ ≤∆∆ MMMN )(: (33)
94  LIU Daoxin et al. / Systems Engineering Procedia 4 (2012) 87 – 98
8 LIU Daoxin, et al./ Systems Engineering Procedia 00 (2011) 000–000
The key is to find the relation between the two optimal solution x* *∆xand , in the following theorem.
Theorem 3: If the nominal market has a unique solution x*
*
∆x
and λ<1, then the perturbed market has a 
unique solution and satisfies the following inequality:
)(
1
2** Mxx β
λ
ε
−
≤− ∆ (34)
It is necessary to prove Theorem 3. Two steps are to be taken: First, prove that if the nominal market
has a unique solution x* *∆xand λ<1, then the perturbed market has a unique solution . Second, prove the 
inequality stated in (34).
（1）Unique solution in perturbed market
If the nominal market in (24) has a unique solution, according to Theorem 1, the matrix M is P-matrix.
Then, according to Theorem 2, this implies that (I−D+DM) is nonsingular for any diagonal matrix. The
following equality is obtained:
))(())(( 0 MMIDMDIMMDDI ∆++−=∆++− (35)
Where，
DDMDIM 10 )(
−+−= (36)
Considering the definition of β(M), the following inequality is satisfied:
NMMMMM ∈∆∀≤≤∆ ;)(0 λβ (37)
Theorem 3 indicates that I+M0
(2)The inequality
∆M is nonsingular for any ∆M∈N due to λ<1. Hence, I−D+D(M+∆M)
is nonsingular from (35) and then the perturbed market in (28) has a unique solution for any ∆M∈N when 
λ<1 is met. 
According to (26) in the Theorem 2, the following inequality is met:
qMxMMxx ∆+∆∆+≤− ∆
*** )(β (38)
β(M+∆M) can be restated as
DDMDIMMIDMMDDI 110
1 )())(())(( −−− +−∆+=∆++− (39)
And
λβ −
≤
∆−
≤∆+ −
1
1
)(1
1))(( 10 MM
MMI (40)
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The following inequality is obtained after taking norms on both sides of (39):
)(
1
1)( MMM β
λ
β
−
≤∆+ (41)
From (38), there is an inequality stated as follows:
qMMxx ∆+∆
−
≤− ∆ )(1
1** β
λ
(42)
After considering the definition of ∆M and ∆q:
)(
1
2** Mxx β
λ
ε
−
≤− ∆ (43)
Where, ε=max{εM‖M‖, εq
To be simple, µ is defined as 
‖q‖}, which is the desired bound.
)(
1
2 Mβ
λ
εµ
−
= (44)
It can be seen from Theorem 3 that µ is the maximum equilibrium shift caused by the uncertainties of 
integration of RERs into the power system.
4. Case study
4.1. Initial data
This paper focuses on the market equilibrium based on RERs and demand response. Wind power is
integrated into the power networks for its wide application. A 4-bus network is utilized to evaluate the 
equilibrium of the electricity market with wind power and demand response.
The 4-bus network is presented in Figure 1. Among the 4 buses, there are two traditional generating 
units which are dispatchable in bus 1 and a wind generator which is non-dispatchable in bus 2. The 
intermittency and randomness of wind generation in bus 2 can therefore be compensated by power 
generated in bus 1, ensuring the reliability of power supply. There are power consumptions at nodes 3 and 
4. The maximum and minimum power supply and demand of these market participants are indicated in 
Table 1, and the minimum value of those is 0. To be simple, it is assumed that every demand and 
generator uses one block to bid on the market.
g1
1
4
3
2
d2
d1
g2
Fig. 1 the 4-bus power network
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Bus x 1 2 3 4 sum
Generation power(MW) 0 26.00 - - 26.00
Demand power(MW) - - 16.00 10.00 26.00
Price($/MWh) 0.7000 0.7000 0.7000 0.7000 -
It can be seen from Table 3 that the price in the equilibrium market is 0.7$/MWh. The amount of 
power offered by g1 is zero, while g2 provides 26MW to meet the electricity amount demanded by both 
d1 and d2
Transmission lines data under market equilibrium are indicated in Table 4.
. It is obvious that the efficiency and equity are maximized when the market equilibrium is 
satisfied.
Table 4 Transmission lines data under market equilibrium
Bus x-bus y 1-3 1-4 2-3 2-4
Flow
P(MW) 3.432 -3.432 12.556 13.428
Q(MVAr) 0.0319 0.0236 0.0695 0.0632
Loss
P(MW) 0 0 0 0
Q(MVAr) 0 0.0146 0.1027 0.0738
4.3. Perturbation analysis
In this 4-bus network, the uncertainties are introduced in the wind generator in bus 2, which are 
denoted as ∆21g . It is assumed that electricity demand of consumers is sensible to price changes. The effect 
of demand response in the form of RTP is denoted as γ21d
(1)Uncertainties of RERs
.
First, the uncertainties incorporating wind generation under fixed loads is to be measured. ∆21g is used 
as the measure of uncertainties of wind generators, and the corresponding operation costs Fg are defined 
as
2211
ggggg ACACF +=
Results of operation costs and equilibrium shift for a range of ∆
(45)
21
g are obtained by simulation. Table 5 
shows the results. It can be seen that as the ∆21g increases, the operation costs Fg and equilibrium shift µ
will have an upward trend.
Table 5 Operation costs and equilibrium shift
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The bids of generators and consumers are also indicated in Table 1. It can be seen that the bids of the 
amount of power generated by g1 and g2 is 20MW, while the price offered by g1 is 50$/MWh, which is 
much higher than 6$/MWh given by the wind generator in bus 2. Obviously, wind power generation has 
the advantage of low costs, thus promoting the rapid development of wind power. Bids of electricity 
demand of d1 and d2 are 16MW and 10MW respectively, with the prices of 6.4$/MWh and 8.5$/MWh 
respectively.
Table 1 Maximum power, minimum power and bids of generators and consumers
g g1 d2 d1 2
Maximum power (MW) 20 26 16 10
Minimum power (MW) 0 0 0 0
Bidding amount (MW) 20 20 16 10
Price ($/MWh) 50 6 6.4 8.5
Transmission lines data from the generating companies to consumer companies are shown in Table 2.
Susceptance Bxy maxxyAand the line capacity limits are included. The line parameters are per unit with 
three-phase base of 230 kV and 10 MVA. It can be seen from Table 2 that capacity limits from wind 
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the operation costs of the overall power networks. It is important to enlarge the capacity to ensure the 
reliability of the networks.
Table 2 Transmission lines data
Bus x-bus y 1-3 1-4 2-3 2-4
X (pu) 0.0505 0.0374 0.0374 0.0637
Capacity limits 100 100 150 200
4.2. Data analysis under market equilibrium
The generation power of generating companies and consumer companies and price under market 
equilibrium are obtained in the absence of the effects of uncertainties of RERs and demand response. The 
results are given in Table 3.
Table 3 Results of the nominal market equilibrium
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Transmission lines data under market equilibrium are indicated in Table 4.
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denoted as ∆21g . It is assumed that electricity demand of consumers is sensible to price changes. The effect 
of demand response in the form of RTP is denoted as γ21d
(1)Uncertainties of RERs
.
First, the uncertainties incorporating wind generation under fixed loads is to be measured. ∆21g is used 
as the measure of uncertainties of wind generators, and the corresponding operation costs Fg are defined 
as
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ggggg ACACF +=
Results of operation costs and equilibrium shift for a range of ∆
(45)
21
g are obtained by simulation. Table 5 
shows the results. It can be seen that as the ∆21g increases, the operation costs Fg and equilibrium shift µ
will have an upward trend.
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∆ 0.0121g 0.02 0.03 0.04 0.05
F 11.197g 10.463 10.725 11.208 11.679
µ 0.0515 0.0632 1.4196 1.5304 1.6817
(2)Effect of demand response
It is time to numerically evaluate the effect of the second perturbation parameter γ21d that is introduced 
in this paper. Table 6 indicates the equilibrium shift for a range of γ21d with different wind forecast errors.
It is observed that when ∆21g is at a fixed level, equilibrium shift will decrease with increasing curtailment 
factor γ21d , which means that demand response can mitigate the equilibrium shift, and thus reduce the cost 
of uncertainty in the presence of a wind forecast error.
Table 6 Equilibrium shift under different wind forecast errors and curtailment factor
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∆ γ21g
21
d γ=0
21
d γ=0.03
21
d =0.06
0.01 0.0677 0.0434 0.0262
0.03 1.4398 0.0601 0.0559
0.04 1.5362 1.4357 0.0763
5. Conclusion
This paper concentrates on the market equilibrium analysis based on models of agent behaviors 
including generating companies, consumer companies and ISO. Perturbation analysis is then implemented
in consideration of the uncertainties of RERs and effect of demand response. Simulation results of the 4-
bus network indicate that demand response can effectively reduce the integration costs of RERs, which 
helps participates in the electricity market to make scientific decisions to maximize their own benefits. 
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